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  1. China and its Double-edged Cyber-sword
    December 9, 2010 | 1044 GMT

    By Sean Noonan
    A recent batch of WikiLeaks cables led Der Spiegel and The New York Times to print front-page stories on China’s cyber-espionage capabilities Dec. 4 and 5. While China’s offensive capabilities on the Internet are widely recognized, the country is discovering the other edge of the sword.
    China is no doubt facing a paradox as it tries to manipulate and confront the growing capabilities of Internet users. Recent arrests of Chinese hackers and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) pronouncements suggest that China fears that its own computer experts, nationalist hackers and social media could turn against the government. While the exact cause of Beijing’s new focus on network security is unclear, it comes at a time when other countries are developing their own defenses against cyber attacks and hot topics like Stuxnet and WikiLeaks are generating new concerns about Internet security.
    One of the U.S. State Department cables released by WikiLeaks focuses on the Chinese-based cyber attack on Google’s servers that became public in January 2010. According to a State Department source mentioned in one of the cables, Li Changchun, the fifth highest-ranking member of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and head of the Party’s Propaganda Department, was concerned about the information he could find on himself through Google’s search engine. He also reportedly ordered the attack on Google. This is single-source information, and since the cables WikiLeaks released do not include the U.S. intelligence community’s actual analysis of the source, we cannot vouch for its accuracy. What it does appear to verify, however, is that Beijing is regularly debating the opportunities and threats presented by the Internet.
    A Shift from Offensive Capabilities
    On Nov. 2, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the official paper for the PLA and the primary medium for announcing top-down policy, recommended the PLA better prepare itself for cyber threats, calling for new strategies to reduce Internet threats that are developing “at an unprecedented rate.” While the report did not detail any strategies, it quoted a PLA order issued for computer experts to focus on the issue.
    The Nov. 2 PLA announcement is part of a long trend of growing network-security concerns in China. In 2009, Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu emphasized that the development of the Internet in China created “unprecedented challenges” in “social control and stability maintenance.” In June 2010, the State Council Information Office published a white paper on the growing threat of cyber crime and how to combat it. Clearly, these challenges have been addressed this year. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) announced Nov. 30 that it had arrested 460 suspected hackers thought to have been involved in 180 cases so far in 2010. This is part of the MPS’ usual end-of-year announcement of statistics to promote its success. But the MPS announcement also said that cyber crime had increased 80 percent this year and seemed to blame the attacks only on hackers inside China.
    These were cases mainly of producing and selling “Trojan” programs (malware that looks legitimate), organizing botnets, assisting others in carrying out denial-of-service attacks and invading government websites. The MPS also closed more than 100 websites that provided hackers with attack programs and taught them various tactics.
    The PLA already has two notoriously large and capable network security units: the Seventh Bureau of the Military Intelligence Department (MID) and the Third Department of the PLA. In simple terms, the MID’s Seventh Bureau is an offensive unit, responsible for managing research institutes that develop new hacking methods, train hackers and produce new hardware and software. The PLA Third Department, defensive in nature, is the third largest signals intelligence-monitoring organization in the world. STRATFOR sources with expertise in network security believe that China’s government-sponsored hacking capabilities are the best in the world. But this perception is based in part on the fact that China demonstrates these capabilities quite often. The United States, on the other hand, is much more restrained in exercising its offensive cyber capabilities and is not inclined to do so until there is a dire and immediate need, such as war.
    Piracy Vulnerability
    The details of China’s escalating effort to improve network security are still murky, but one recently announced campaign against software piracy is notable. On Nov. 30, Deputy Commerce Minister Jiang Zengwei announced a new six-month crackdown on illegally copied products in China. He said the focus was on pirated software, counterfeit pharmaceuticals and mislabeled agricultural products. The Chinese public has pushed for more regulation of pharmaceuticals and food due to a rising number of cases in which people have become sick or even died because of falsely labeled or tainted products, such as melamine-contaminated milk. But Beijing seems to be even more concerned about the vulnerabilities created by running unlicensed and non-updated software, and publicizing the crackdown is clearly an attempt by Beijing to appease Western governments and businesses that are placing growing pressure on China.
    Indeed, China has a sizable counterfeit economy, much to the ire of Western businesses. While Beijing may placate Westerners by announcing crackdowns for the benefit of international audiences, it takes more forceful measures when it sees a larger threat to itself, and the security emphasis now seems to be on the threat of running insecure software on government computers. The problem with unlicensed software is that it does not receive automatic updates from the manufacturer, which usually are sent out to fix vulnerabilities to malware. Unlicensed software is thus left open to viral infiltration. It is also cheap and easy to get, which makes it pervasive throughout both government and private computer networks.
    One of the measures Beijing has started to implement is requiring licensed software to be installed on new computers before they are sold, which also gives the government an opportunity to install censorship measures like Green Dam. One persistent problem is that much of the pre-installed software still consists of pirated copies. While China has released statistics showing that the use of legitimate software in China has increased dramatically, the Business Software Alliance, an international software industry group, estimates that 79 percent of the software sold in China in 2009 was illegally copied, creating a loss to the industry of $7.6 billion in revenue. Even more important to Beijing, these statistics mean the vast majority of Chinese computer systems — government and private alike — remain vulnerable to malware.
    At the same Nov. 30 news conference at which Jiang announced the new anti-piracy initiative, Yan Xiaohong, deputy head of the General Administration of Press and Publication and vice director of the National Copyright Administration, announced a nationwide inspection of local and central government computers to make sure they were running licensed software. While this suggests Beijing’s major concern is the security of government computers, it also emphasizes how widespread the unlicensed software problem is.
    This new focus on using legitimate software, however, will not be a complete solution to China’s Internet vulnerabilities. There has been little effort to stop the selling of copied software, and it is still very easy to download other programs, licensed and unlicensed, and malware along with them (such as QQ). Moreover, the new security measures are dealing only with the symptoms, not the underlying problem, of a counterfeit-heavy economy. A six-month crackdown will not undermine or eliminate software piracy in China; to do so would require an immense and sustained investment of time, money and manpower. Indeed, China has been a hub for pirating software, films and other copyrighted material for so long that the enormous domestic economic base that has grown up around it would be virtually impossible to dismantle. In any case, vulnerabilities still exist in legitimate software, even if it is better protected against novice hackers. New vulnerabilities are constantly being found and exploited until software companies come up with the appropriate patches.
    From Nationalist Hackers to Dissident Threats
    China’s highly developed hacking capabilities, more offensive than defensive, include Internet censorship measures like the infamous Great Firewall, and the official police force run by the MPS specifically to monitor Chinese Internet traffic and censor websites is 40,000 strong. China also has developed two unofficial methods of censorship. First, operators of private websites and forums must follow certain government regulations to prevent statements critical of the government from being disseminated, which encourages private operators to be their own censors. Second, there is a veritable army of nationalistic computer users in China that include “hacktivist” groups such as the Red Hacker Alliance, China Union Eagle and the Honker Union, with thousands of members each. They became famous after the 1999 “accidental” bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which prompted China-based hackers to attack and deface U.S. government websites. The Chinese government, state-owned enterprises and private companies also engage public relations firms to hire, deploy and manage what have become colloquially known as “Party of Five Maoists.” These are individuals who get paid half a yuan (5 mao) for every positive Internet post they write regarding government policy, product reviews and other issues.
    But as China’s Internet-using population nears 400 million, with nearly 160 million using social networking, Beijing recognizes the risk of all this spiraling out of control. Censors have not been able to keep up on the social-networking front. Even with limited or banned access to sites like Twitter and Facebook, their Chinese versions, Weibo and Kaixin, for example, are expanding exponentially. While the government may exercise more control over the Chinese-based sites, it cannot keep up with the huge number of posts on topics the CPC considers disharmonious. The recent announcement of Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize is an example of news that was not reported at first in Chinese media but through social networking sites, spreading like wildfire. And the censorship is not exclusive; even non-dissidents can be censored, such as Prime Minister Wen Jiabao when he recently called for limited political reform.
    China’s large Internet population will not all be nationalists. And if those who learn skills from informal hackers turn into dissidents, Beijing would consider them a serious threat. The Internet presents exactly the type of tool that could pose a major threat to the CPC because it spans regions, classes and ethnicities. Most social grievances are local and economic or ethnic-based. The potential for one opposition group to be united nationwide over the Internet is one of Beijing’s gravest concerns. It has realized that a weapon it once wielded so deftly against foreign powers and business entities can now be used against Beijing.
    Outside Issues
    At the same time Beijing reached this realization, WikiLeaks demonstrated the possibility for sensitive government information to be spread globally through the Internet. Beijing saw that if the United States, with its expertise in signals intelligence and security, could be vulnerable to such a threat, so could China. Stuxnet demonstrated the vulnerability of important infrastructure to cyber attack, one reason for China’s new emphasis on licensed software (Iran is known to run unlicensed Siemens software). China’s recent emphasis on network security is likely linked to all of these factors, or it may be due to a threat seen but as yet unpublicized, such as a cyber attack or leak inside China that the government has been able to keep quiet.
    Other countries have also been implementing new network security measures, most notably the United States. On Oct. 31, the Maryland-based U.S. Cyber Command became fully operational, and its commander is also the head of the National Security Agency, the premier U.S. government entity for signals intelligence. (Thus, China’s giving Internet security responsibility to the PLA should come as no surprise to the United States.) And as China realizes the difficulties of defending against attacks in cyberspace, which tends to favor the offense, the United States is wrestling with the same problems and complexities as it tries to shield government, civilian and commercial computer systems, all of which require different degrees of control and operate under different laws. As cyber espionage and cyber sabotage become even greater concerns, China will be forced to face the far more difficult task of not only pecking away at the Pentagon’s firewalls but also providing for its own internal system security.
    These new efforts all contradict China’s long-standing policy of cultivating a population of nationalistic computer users. This effort has been useful to Beijing when it sees a need to cause disruption, whether by attacking U.S. sites after perceived affronts like the Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade or preventing access from powerful foreign entities like Google. But China has also recognized that developing these public capabilities can be dangerous. Nationalist Chinese hackers, if motivated by the right cause and united through the pervasive Internet, can always turn on the government. And the situation seems to have more and more governments on edge, where simple mistakes can raise suspicions. China’sredirection of a large amount of Internet traffic in April caused an outcry from the United States and other countries, though it may well have been an accident.
    It is hard to tell what Beijing sees, specifically, as a first-tier cyber threat, but its decision to develop an effective response to all manner of threats is evident.
    Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR, at the beginning or end of the report.

    “China and its Double-edged Cyber-sword is republished with permission of STRATFOR.”

    Read more: China and its Double-edged Cyber-sword | STRATFOR

    Comment by mihaibeltechi — December 9, 2010 @ 3:16 pm | Reply

  2. China şi ei cu două tăişuri Cyber-sabie-GOOGLE TRANSLATE
    09 decembrie 2010 |

    De Sean Noonan
    Un lot recent de cabluri Wikileaks a condus Der Spiegel şi New York Times pentru a imprima povesti pe prima pagină pe capacităţile Chinei cyber-spionaj 04 decembrie şi 5. În timp ce capacităţile ofensive Chinei pe Internet sunt larg recunoscute, ţara este descoperirea cealaltă margine de sabie.
    China este, fără îndoială confruntă cu un paradox, deoarece incearca sa manipuleze si sa se confrunte cu capacităţile tot mai mare de utilizatori de Internet. arestările recente de hackerii chinezi şi Armata Populară de Eliberare (PLA) declaraţii sugerează că temerile China, care sa computer experţi proprii, hackeri naţionaliste şi mass-media sociale ar putea întoarce împotriva guvernului. Deşi cauza exactă a noului Focus de la Beijing ce priveşte securitatea reţelelor este neclar, vine într-un moment când alte ţări sunt în curs de dezvoltare propria lor apărare împotriva atacurilor cibernetice şi subiecte fierbinţi cum ar fi Stuxnet şi Wikileaks sunt generatoare de noi preocupări cu privire la securitatea pe Internet.
    Unul dintre cablurile Departamentul de Stat al SUA a lansat de Wikileaks se concentrează pe chineze pe bază de atac cibernetic pe serverele Google care au devenit publice în ianuarie 2010. Potrivit unui Departamentului de sursă de stat menţionat într-unul din cablurile, Li Changchun, cel mai înalt rang al cincilea membru al Partidului Comunist din China (CPC) şi şef al partidului Departamentului de Propagandă, a fost preocupat de informaţiile pe care le-ar putea găsi pe el însuşi prin Google motor de căutare. De asemenea, el a ordonat se pare atac pe Google. Aceasta este unică sursă de informare, şi deoarece cablurile lansat Wikileaks nu includ SUA comunitatea de informaţii reale analiză a sursei, nu putem garanta pentru exactitatea acesteia. Ceea ce nu pare să verifice, totuşi, este faptul că Beijing este dezbat în mod regulat oportunităţile şi ameninţările prezentate de Internet.
    Trecerea de la capacităţile ofensive
    Pe 02 noiembrie, Armata Populară de Eliberare Daily, ziarul oficial pentru APL şi mediul primar pentru anunţarea de sus în jos, a recomandat PLA pregăti mai bine în sine pentru ameninţărilor cibernetice, de asteptare pentru noi strategii de reducere a amenintarilor de pe Internet care sunt în curs de dezvoltare ” într-un ritm fără precedent “În timp ce raportul nu a detaliat orice strategii., el a citat o ordine PLA emis pentru experţi în informatică, să se concentreze pe problema.
    02 noiembrie Anunţul PLA este parte a unui trend lung de preocupări în creştere de reţea de securitate în China. În 2009, ministrul Securităţii Publice Meng Jianzhu a subliniat că dezvoltarea internetului în China a creat “provocări fără precedent” în În luna iunie 2010 “control social şi menţinerea stabilităţii.”, Biroului de Informare al Consiliului de Stat a publicat o carte albă cu privire la ameninţarea tot mai mare de criminalităţii cibernetice şi cum să-l combată. În mod evident, aceste provocări au fost abordate în acest an. Ministerul Securitatii Publice (MPS) a anunţat 30 noi că a arestat 460 hackeri suspectate de crezut că au fost implicaţi în 180 de cazuri până acum în 2010. Aceasta este parte a parlamentarilor anunţul obişnuit sfârşitul de an de statistici pentru a promova succesul său. Dar anunţ MPS, de asemenea, a spus că criminalităţii cibernetice au crescut cu 80 la sută în acest an şi părea să dea vina pe atacurile doar pe hackeri în interiorul Chinei.
    Acestea au fost cazuri în principal de producţie şi vânzare “Trojan” programe (malware care arată legitim), organizarea de botnets , asistarea alţii în desfăşurarea out-of-service atacuri denial şi invadatoare site-urilor guvernamentale. MPS închis, de asemenea, mai mult de 100 de site-uri care au oferit hackeri cu programe de atac şi ia învăţat tactici diferite.
    PLA are deja două mari şi capabile de securitate a reţelei de unităţi de notorietate: Biroul şaptea a Departamentului de Informatii Militare (MDI) şi Departamentul a treia a PLA . În termeni simpli, MID-al şaptelea Biroului este o unitate de ofensator, responsabilă cu gestionarea institute de cercetare care se dezvolta noi metode de hacking, hackeri de tren şi pentru a produce noi componente hardware şi software. În al treilea rând Departamentul PLA, defensiv în natură, este al treilea cel mai mare semnalele-organizaţia de monitorizare inteligenta din lume. STRATFOR surse cu expertiza în domeniul securităţii reţelelor cred că Chinei sponsorizate de hacking capabilităţi guvernamentale sunt cele mai bune din lume. Dar această percepţie se bazează în parte pe faptul că China demonstrează aceste capabilităţi destul de des. Statele Unite ale Americii, pe de altă parte, este mult mai restrânsă în exercitarea sale cibernetice capacităţile ofensive şi nu este înclinat să facă acest lucru până când nu există o nevoie stringentă şi imediată, cum ar fi războiul.
    Pirateria vulnerabilitate
    Detaliile de escaladare a efortului de China pentru a îmbunătăţi securitatea reţelei sunt încă tulbure, dar a anunţat recent o campanie împotriva pirateriei software este notabil. Pe 30 noiembrie, ministrul adjunct al Comerţului Jiang Zengwei a anunţat o perioadă de şase luni represiunii nou pe copiate ilegal de produse în China. El a spus accentul sa pus pe software-ul piratat, contrafăcut farmaceutice şi produse agricole etichetati in mod gresit. Publicul chinez a împins pentru reglementarea mai de produse farmaceutice şi produse alimentare datorită unui număr tot mai mare de cazuri în care oamenii au devenit bolnavi sau chiar a murit din cauza etichetate sau fals tentată de produse, cum ar fi lapte contaminat cu melamină . Dar Beijing pare a fi chiar mai multe în cauză cu privire la vulnerabilităţile create prin rularea şi non-actualizat software fără licenţă, precum şi publicarea represiunea este în mod clar o încercare de Beijing pentru a potoli setea guvernele occidentale şi întreprinderi care sunt introducerea presiunea crescândă asupra Chinei.
    Într-adevăr, China are o economie contrafăcute barosan , mult la IRE de afaceri occidentale. În timp ce Beijing se poate împăca occidentali de reprimări anunţând pentru beneficiul publicului internaţional, este nevoie de măsuri mai puternice atunci când vede o ameninţare mai mare la sine, şi accentul pus de securitate acum pare a fi pe ameninţarea de a rula software-ului nesigure pe computerele guvernamentale. Problema cu software fără licenţă este că nu a primi actualizări automate de la producător, care de obicei sunt trimise pentru a remedia vulnerabilităţile faţă de malware. Fără licenţă software-ul este, prin urmare lăsat deschis la infiltrare virale. Este, de asemenea, ieftin şi uşor pentru a obţine, ceea ce face şi omniprezentă în întreaga private reţelelor de calculatoare guvernamentale ambele.
    Una dintre măsurile Beijing a început să pună în aplicare este necesită software licenţiate pentru a fi instalat pe computerele noi înainte ca acestea sunt vândute, care oferă, de asemenea guvernului posibilitatea de a instala măsuri de cenzura ca Green Dam . O problemă persistentă este că o mare parte din pre-instalat software-ul este format încă de copii piratate. În timp ce China a lansat statistici care arata ca utilizarea de software legal din China a crescut dramatic, Business Software Alliance, un grup internaţional industria de software, estimeaza ca 79 de procente a software-ului vândute în China, în 2009 a fost copiate ilegal, creând o pierdere la Industria de 7.6 miliarde dolari în venituri. Chiar mai important la Beijing, aceste statistici înseamnă marea majoritate a sistemelor de calculatoare din China – guvernamentale şi private deopotrivă – rămân vulnerabile la malware.
    La aceeaşi conferinţă de ştiri 30 noiembrie la care Jiang a anunţat noua iniţiativă anti-piraterie, Yan Xiaohong, şef adjunct al Administraţiei Generale a presei şi vice-director al Administraţiei Naţionale de autor, a anunţat o inspecţie la nivel naţional de autorităţile locale şi centrale calculatoare pentru a se asigura că au fost difuzate de software licenţiat. În timp ce acest lucru sugerează preocupare majora de la Beijing este securitatea computerelor guvernului, subliniază de asemenea cat de raspandite sunt problema software fără licenţă este.
    Acest nou accent pe utilizarea de software legitim, cu toate acestea, nu va fi o soluţie completă la Internet, vulnerabilităţile de China. Nu a fost puţin efort pentru a opri vânzarea de software-ul copiat, şi este încă foarte uşor pentru a descărca alte programe, autorizate şi neautorizate, malware şi împreună cu ei (cum ar fi QQ ). Mai mult decât atât, măsurile de securitate noi de-a face numai cu simptomele nu, problema de bază, de a-grele economie contrafăcute. A-represiunea şase luni nu va submina sau elimina pirateriei software din China, să facă acest lucru ar necesita o şi susţinută de investiţii imense de timp, bani şi forţă de muncă. Într-adevăr, China a fost un hub pentru pirateria software, filme şi alte materiale cu drepturi de autor pentru atât de mult încât piaţa internă economice de bază, care a crescut enorm în jurul ar fi practic imposibil să demonteze. În orice caz, există încă vulnerabilităţi în software-ul legitim, chiar dacă este mai bine protejat împotriva hackerilor novice. Noi vulnerabilitati sunt în mod constant a fost găsit şi exploatat până la companii de software veni cu patch-uri corespunzătoare.
    Hackerii de la naţionaliste la ameninţări Dissident
    China a dezvoltat capacităţi extrem de hacking, ofensiv mai mult de defensiva, include măsuri de cenzura pe Internet, cum ar fi infamul Great Firewall , şi forţele de poliţie oficiale conduse de MPS în mod specific pentru a monitoriza traficul Internet din China şi să cenzureze site-uri web este de 40.000 puternic. China, de asemenea, a dezvoltat două metode neoficiale de cenzură. În primul rând, operatorii de site-uri şi forumuri private trebuie să respecte anumite reglementări guvernamentale pentru a împiedica declaraţii critice la adresa guvernului de a fi difuzate, ceea ce încurajează operatorii privaţi să fie proprii cenzori lor. În al doilea rând, există o adevărată armată de utilizatori de calculatoare naţionaliste în China, care includ “hacktivist” grupuri, cum ar fi Red Hacker Alianţei, China Eagle şi Uniunea Honker, cu mii de membri fiecare. Ei au devenit celebru după 1999 “accidental” bombardarea Ambasadei Chinei din Belgrad, care a determinat pe bază de hackeri pentru a ataca China şi SUA desfigureze site-urilor guvernamentale. Guvernul chinez, aflate în proprietatea întreprinderilor de stat şi companiile private se angaja, de asemenea, firmele de relaţii publice pentru a angaja, implementeze şi să gestioneze ceea ce au devenit cotidian cunoscut sub numele de yuani (5 Mao) pentru fiecare “Party of Five Maoists.” Aceste persoane care sunt platit de o jumătate de post Internet pozitive pe care le scrie cu privire la politica Guvernului, opiniile si alte probleme.
    Dar, aşa cum a Chinei de Internet se apropie de populaţia care utilizează 400 milioane, cu aproape 160 milioane utilizarea de reţele sociale, Beijing recunoaşte riscul de toate acestea scape de sub control. Cenzorii nu au putut să ţină pasul pe front social-networking. Chiar şi cu acces limitat sau interzis la site-uri ca Twitter şi Facebook, chineză versiunile lor, Weibo şi Kaixin, de exemplu, sunt în expansiune exponenţial. În timp ce guvernul poate exercita mai mult control asupra site-urilor bazate pe chinezi, nu se poate ţine pasul cu numărul imens de mesaje pe teme CPP consideră nearmonios. Anunţarea recentă a lui Liu Xiaobo Premiul Nobel pentru Pace este un exemplu de ştiri, care nu a fost raportată la început în mass-media chineză, dar prin crearea de reţele sociale site-uri, răspândeşte extraordinar de repede. Şi cenzura nu este exclusivă, chiar non-disidenţi poate fi cenzurat, cum ar fi prim-ministru Wen Jiabao, când a cerut recent reformei politice limitate .
    populaţiei din China Internet de mare nu va fi toţi naţionaliştii. Şi dacă cei care învaţă abilităţi de hackeri informale transforma într-disidenţi, Beijing ar considera-le o ameninţare serioasă. Internetul prezintă exact tipul de instrument care ar putea reprezenta o ameninţare majoră pentru CPC, deoarece regiunile deschideri, clase şi etnii. Cele mai multe nemulţumiri sociale şi economice sunt locale sau etnice bazate pe. Potenţialul pentru un grup de opoziţie să se unească la nivel naţional pe Internet este una dintre preocuparile cele mai grave din Beijing. Aceasta a realizat că o armă o dată deţineau astfel abil împotriva puterilor străine şi ale entităţilor de afaceri pot fi acum folosite împotriva Beijing.
    Probleme afara
    În acelaşi timp, Beijing ajuns la această realizare, Wikileaks a demonstrat posibilitatea pentru informaţii guvernamentale sensibile să fie răspândite la nivel global prin intermediul internetului. Beijing a văzut că, dacă Statele Unite, cu expertiza in inteligenta semnale şi de securitate, ar putea fi vulnerabile la o astfel de ameninţare, aşa ar putea China. Stuxnet demonstrat vulnerabilitatea de infrastructură importante pentru un atac cibernetic, un motiv pentru un nou accent Chinei pe software licenţiat (Iran este cunoscut pentru a rula software fără licenţă Siemens). Accentul recente China privind securitatea reţelei este probabil legat de toti acesti factori, sau poate fi cauza o ameninţare, ci ca văzut încă unpublicized, cum ar fi un atac cibernetic sau scurgeri în interiorul Chinei că guvernul a fost în măsură să tacă.
    Alte ţări au fost, de asemenea securitatea reţelelor de punere în aplicare noi măsuri, mai ales din Statele Unite. Pe 31 octombrie, a Maryland, pe baza SUA Cyber Comandamentul a devenit pe deplin operaţional, şi comandantul acesteia este, de asemenea, şeful Agenţiei Naţionale de Securitate, premierul a SUA entitate guvernamentală pentru inteligenţa semnale. (Astfel, China atribuirea responsabilităţii de securitate pe Internet la PLA ar trebui să vină ca o surpriză în Statele Unite.) Şi, după cum China îşi dă seama de dificultăţile de a apăra împotriva atacurilor în spaţiul virtual , care tinde să favorizeze infracţiunea, Statele Unite se lupta cu aceeaşi problemele şi complexitatea timp ce încearcă să scut guvernamentale, comerciale şi sisteme de calculator civile, toate din care necesită diferite grade de control şi funcţionează în conformitate cu legi diferite. Ca spionaj cibernetic şi sabotaj cibernetice deveni mai mare se referă chiar, China va fi forţat să se confrunte cu mai dificilă sarcina de departe nu numai de ciugulit departe la Pentagonului firewall-uri, dar, de asemenea, pentru asigurarea sale de securitate internă sistem propriu.
    Aceste eforturi noi de lungă durată în contradicţie cu politica Chinei tuturor de a cultiva o populaţie de utilizatori de calculatoare naţionaliste. Acest efort a fost utilă la Beijing, atunci când consideră că trebuie să cauzeze o dezorganizare, fie prin atacarea site-uri din SUA după afronturi perceput ca bombardarea Ambasadei Chinei din Belgrad sau împiedicarea accesului la entităţi străine puternice cum ar fi Google. Dar China a recunoscut, de asemenea, că dezvoltarea acestor capacităţi public poate fi periculos. Chineză hackeri naţionalist, dacă motivată de cauza dreapta şi unite prin intermediul internetului omniprezent, poate transforma întotdeauna asupra guvernului. Şi situaţia pare a avea şi mai multe guverne mai mult pe margine, unde greşeli simple pot ridica suspiciuni. China redirecţionarea o cantitate mare de trafic Internet in aprilie provocat un val de proteste din partea Statelor Unite şi alte ţări, deşi aceasta poate fi bine avea un accident.
    Este greu să spun ceea ce vede la Beijing, în special, ca o ameninţare cibernetice de prim nivel, dar decizia sa de a dezvolta un răspuns eficient la tot felul de ameninţări este evidentă.
    Retipărirea sau republicarea acestui raport pe site-uri este autorizat prin afişarea în mod vizibil, următoarea teză, inclusiv hyperlink la Stratfor, la începutul sau la sfârşitul raportului.

    ” China şi ei cu două tăişuri Cyber-sabie este republicată, cu permisiunea de STRATFOR. ”

    Read more: China and its Double-edged Cyber-sword | STRATFOR

    Comment by mihaibeltechi — December 9, 2010 @ 3:18 pm | Reply

  3. By George Friedman
    Founder and Chairman

    Editor’s Note: George Friedman originally wrote this Geopolitical Weekly on North Korea’s nuclear strategy on Jan. 29. More than two months later, the geopolitical contours of the still-evolving crisis have become more clear, so we believe it important to once again share with readers the fundamentals outlined in this earlier forecast.

    North Korea’s state-run media reported Sunday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the country’s top security officials to take “substantial and high-profile important state measures,” which has been widely interpreted to mean that North Korea is planning its third nuclear test. Kim said the orders were retaliation for the U.S.-led push to tighten U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang following North Korea’s missile test in October. A few days before Kim’s statement emerged, the North Koreans said future tests would target the United States, which North Korea regards as its key adversary along with Washington’s tool, South Korea.

    North Korea has been using the threat of tests and the tests themselves as weapons against its neighbors and the United States for years. On the surface, threatening to test weapons does not appear particularly sensible. If the test fails, you look weak. If it succeeds, you look dangerous without actually having a deliverable weapon. And the closer you come to having a weapon, the more likely someone is to attack you so you don’t succeed in actually getting one. Developing a weapon in absolute secret would seem to make more sense. When the weapon is ready, you display it, and you have something solid to threaten enemies with.

    North Korea, of course, has been doing this for years and doing it successfully, so what appears absurd on the surface quite obviously isn’t. On the contrary, it has proved to be a very effective maneuver. North Korea is estimated to have a gross domestic product of about $28 billion, about the same as Latvia or Turkmenistan. Yet it has maneuvered itself into a situation where the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea have sat down with it at the negotiating table in a bid to persuade it not to build weapons. Sometimes, the great powers give North Korea money and food to persuade it not to develop weapons. It sometimes agrees to a halt, but then resumes its nuclear activities. It never completes a weapon, but it frequently threatens to test one. And when it carries out such tests, it claims its tests are directed at the United States and South Korea, as if the test itself were a threat.

    There is brilliance in North Korea’s strategy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea was left in dire economic straits. There were reasonable expectations that its government would soon collapse, leading to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, the goal of the North Korean government was regime survival, so it was terrified that outside powers would invade or support an uprising against it. It needed a strategy that would dissuade anyone from trying that. Being weak in every sense, this wasn’t going to be easy, but the North Koreans developed a strategy that we described more than 10 years ago as ferocious, weak and crazy. North Korea has pursued this course since the 1990s, and the latest manifestation of this strategy was on display last week. The strategy has worked marvelously and is still working.

    A Three-Part Strategy

    First, the North Koreans positioned themselves as ferocious by appearing to have, or to be on the verge of having, devastating power. Second, they positioned themselves as being weak such that no matter how ferocious they are, there would be no point in pushing them because they are going to collapse anyway. And third, they positioned themselves as crazy, meaning pushing them would be dangerous since they were liable to engage in the greatest risks imaginable at the slightest provocation.

    In the beginning, Pyongyang’s ability to appear ferocious was limited to the North Korean army’s power to shell Seoul. It had massed artillery along the border and could theoretically devastate the southern capital, assuming the North had enough ammunition, its artillery worked and air power didn’t lay waste to its massed artillery. The point was not that it was going to level Seoul but that it had the ability to do so. There were benefits to outsiders in destabilizing the northern regime, but Pyongyang’s ferocity — uncertain though its capabilities were — was enough to dissuade South Korea and its allies from trying to undermine the regime. Its later move to develop missiles and nuclear weapons followed from the strategy of ferocity — since nothing was worth a nuclear war, enraging the regime by trying to undermine it wasn’t worth the risk.

    Many nations have tried to play the ferocity game, but the North Koreans added a brilliant and subtle twist to it: being weak. The North Koreans advertised the weakness of their economy, particularly its food insecurity, by various means. This was not done overtly, but by allowing glimpses of its weakness. Given the weakness of its economy and the difficulty of life in North Korea, there was no need to risk trying to undermine the North. It would collapse from its own defects.

    This was a double inoculation. The North Koreans’ ferocity with weapons whose effectiveness might be questionable, but still pose an unquantifiable threat, caused its enemies to tread carefully. Why risk unleashing its ferocity when its weakness would bring it down? Indeed, a constant debate among Western analysts over the North’s power versus its weakness combines to paralyze policymakers.

    The North Koreans added a third layer to perfect all of this. They portrayed themselves as crazy, working to appear unpredictable, given to extravagant threats and seeming to welcome a war. Sometimes, they reaffirmed they were crazy via steps like sinking South Korean ships for no apparent reason. As in poker, so with the North: You can play against many sorts of players, from those who truly understand the odds to those who are just playing for fun, but never, ever play poker against a nut. He is totally unpredictable, can’t be gamed, and if you play with his head you don’t know what will happen.

    So long as the North Koreans remained ferocious, weak and crazy, the best thing to do was not irritate them too much and not to worry what kind of government they had. But being weak and crazy was the easy part for the North; maintaining its appearance of ferocity was more challenging. Not only did the North Koreans have to keep increasing their ferocity, they had to avoid increasing it so much that it overpowered the deterrent effect of their weakness and craziness.

    A Cautious Nuclear Program

    Hence, we have North Korea’s eternal nuclear program. It never quite produces a weapon, but no one can be sure whether a weapon might be produced. Due to widespread perceptions that the North Koreans are crazy, it is widely believed they might rush to complete their weapon and go to war at the slightest provocation. The result is the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea holding meetings with North Korea to try to persuade it not to do something crazy.

    Interestingly, North Korea never does anything significant and dangerous, or at least not dangerous enough to break the pattern. Since the Korean War, North Korea has carefully calculated its actions, timing them to avoid any move that could force a major reaction. We see this caution built into its nuclear program. After more than a decade of very public ferocity, the North Koreans have not come close to a deliverable weapon. But since if you upset them, they just might, the best bet has been to tread lightly and see if you can gently persuade them not to do something insane.

    The North’s positioning is superb: Minimal risky action sufficient to lend credibility to its ferocity and craziness plus endless rhetorical threats maneuvers North Korea into being a major global threat in the eyes of the great powers. Having won themselves this position, the North Koreans are not about to risk it, even if a 20-something leader is hurling threats.

    The China Angle and the Iranian Pupil

    There is, however, a somewhat more interesting dimension emerging. Over the years, the United States, Japan and South Korea have looked to the Chinese to intercede and persuade the North Koreans not to do anything rash. This diplomatic pattern has established itself so firmly that we wonder what the actual Chinese role is in all this. China is currently engaged in territorial disputes with U.S. allies in the South and East China seas. Whether anyone would or could go to war over islands in these waters is dubious, but the situation is still worth noting.

    The Chinese and the Japanese have been particularly hostile toward one another in recent weeks in terms of rhetoric and moving their ships around. A crisis in North Korea, particularly one in which the North tested a nuclear weapon, would inevitably initiate the diplomatic dance whereby the Americans and Japanese ask the Chinese to intercede with the North Koreans. The Chinese would oblige. This is not a great effort for them, since having detonated a nuclear device, the North isn’t interested in doing much more. In fact, Pyongyang will be drawing on the test’s proverbial fallout for some time. The Chinese are calling in no chits with the North Koreans, and the Americans and Japanese — terribly afraid of what the ferocious, weak, crazy North Koreans will do next — will be grateful to China for defusing the “crisis.” And who could be so churlish as to raise issues on trade or minor islands when China has used its power to force North Korea to step down?

    It is impossible for us to know what the Chinese are thinking, and we have no overt basis for assuming the Chinese and North Koreans are collaborating, but we do note that China has taken an increasing interest in stabilizing North Korea. For its part, North Korea has tended to stage these crises — and their subsequent Chinese interventions — at quite useful times for Beijing.

    It should also be noted that other countries have learned the ferocious, weak, crazy maneuver from North Korea. Iran is the best pupil. It has convincingly portrayed itself as ferocious via its nuclear program, endlessly and quite publicly pursuing its program without ever quite succeeding. It is also persistently seen as weak, perpetually facing economic crises and wrathful mobs of iPod-wielding youths. Whether Iran can play the weakness card as skillfully as North Korea remains unclear — Iran just doesn’t have the famines North Korea has.

    Additionally, Iran’s rhetoric at times can certainly be considered crazy: Tehran has carefully cultivated perceptions that it would wage nuclear war even if this meant the death of all Iranians. Like North Korea, Iran also has managed to retain its form of government and its national sovereignty. Endless predictions of the fall of the Islamic republic to a rising generation have proved false.

    I do not mean to appear to be criticizing the “ferocious, weak and crazy” strategy. When you are playing a weak hand, such a strategy can yield demonstrable benefits. It preserves regimes, centers one as a major international player and can wring concessions out of major powers. It can be pushed too far, however, when the fear of ferocity and craziness undermines the solace your opponents find in your weakness.

    Diplomacy is the art of nations achieving their ends without resorting to war. It is particularly important for small, isolated nations to survive without going to war. As in many things, the paradox of appearing willing to go to war in spite of all rational calculations can be the foundation for avoiding war. It is a sound strategy, and for North Korea and Iran, for the time being at least, it has worked.

    Read more: Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy | Stratfor

    Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy

    Read more: Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy | Stratfor
    “Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy is republished with permission of Stratfor.”

    Read more: Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy | Stratfor

    Comment by mihaibeltechi — April 9, 2013 @ 3:20 pm | Reply


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